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In the Supreme Court of 
The State of Utah 
B. W. MCMAHON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
MELISSA TANNER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Respondent's Brief 
CIVIL 
No. 7673 
Respondent agrees in general with the statement of 
facts set out in the Appellant's Brief, but cannot agree with 
the appellant's statement on page 5 of her brief that "The 
purchasers (from respondent) ... proceeded to construct an 
outdoor theatre on the defendant's land." The fallacy of 
this statement is that it assumes the very question that was 
tried in the lower court (which found in favor of plaintiff) 
and which is presented to this court on appeal. 
While this may be considered a case in equity wherein 
this court has the jurisdiction to review questions of both 
law and fact, yet in so doing, the court must consider the 
circumstance that the trial court saw and heard the wit-
nesses and observed their demeanor and conduct on the wit-
ness stand, and was therefore in a favorable position to 
weigh the testimony. Under these circumstances, the 
judgment of the trial court should not be lightly disre-
garded. The trial court found "the issues of this case in 
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2 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant." (Tr. p. 
101). 
We will meet defendant's arguments in the order they 
were advanced in her brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
Defendant's Contention that Plaintiff is not Entitled 
to Relief because of his "Negligence" 
In the first place it appears to the writers of this brief 
that the use of the terms "negligence" and "carelessness" 
by the defendant is confusing. We do not believe that the 
word "negligence" has any place in an equity case of this 
type not withstanding the fact that it is loosely used in 
some of the cases referred to by defendant. Rather the 
flllestion is one of diligence or lack of diligence. 
The fundamental issue 011 this particular point advanc-
ed by the defendant is whether or not this case is one which 
warrants the interference of a court of equity. To answer 
this question an examination must be made of the conduct 
of the plaintiff and of the conduct of the defendant and 
whether or not the defendant has changed her position or 
would be adversely affected by the action which has now 
been taken by the trial court. 
The general position taken by the defendant in her 
first argument, namely that equity will never intervene if 
there is inexcusable "negligence" on the part of the plain-
tiff, is not the law and is not sustained by the authorities .. 
Defendant cites the case of Wolfgang vs~ Henry Thiele 
Catering Company, an Oregon case, 275 Pacific 33. .That 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
case does set forth a correct exposition of the equitable 
principles. At page 36 the court quotes with approval from 
Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. (Fourth Edition) Section 8567 as fol-
lows: 
"As a second requisite, it has sometimes been 
said in very general tern1s that a mistake resulting 
from the complaining party's ·own negligence will 
never be relieved. This proposition is not sus-
tained by the authorities. It would be more ac-
curate to say that vvhere the mistake is wholly 
caused by the want of that care and diligence in 
the transaction which should be used by every per-
son of reasonable prudence, and the absence of 
\vhich \Yould be a violation of legal duty, a court of 
equity \Yill not interpose its relief; but even with 
this more guarded mode of statement, each in-
stance of negligence must depend to a great ex-
tent upon its own circumstances. It is not every 
negligence that will stay the hand of the court. 
The conclusion from the best authorities seems to 
be, that the neglect must amount to the violation 
of a positive legal duty.· The highest possible care 
is not demanded. Even a clearly established negli-
gence may not of itself be a sufficient ground for 
refusing relief, if it appears that the other party 
has not been prejudiced thereby." 
ln this case the court further quotes with appr9val 
from 21 Corpus Juris at page 88 as follows: 
"As a general rule a party will not be given 
relief against a mistake induced by his own cul-
pable negligence, as against one who was free 
from fault, ~~ * * But this rule is not inflexible and 
in many cases relief may be granted although the 
mistake \Vas not unmixed with some element of 
negligence, particularly where the other party has 
been in no way prejudiced; * * * Where the act 
done by mistake is one calculated to induce others 
to take a line of conduct which will put them to 
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loss if the mistake is corrected, it ought to be clear · 
that the party asking for relief has been led into 
the mistake in spite of the employment of the 
highest degree of vigilance. But where no one is 
injured by the mistake other than the party him-
self, and no one has changed his position in con-
sequence of what has been done and of the mis-
take, relief may be granted even though a high 
degree of care has not been exercised. E~ven gross 
negligence has been held insufficient to prevent re-
lief for a unilateral mistake made with the know-
ledge of the other party." 
In the first place, in the case now before the court 
there was not any gross "negligence" on the part of the 
plaintiff. In the second place the defendant did not change 
her position on account of anything which the plaintiff did 
or failed to do. And in the third place the defendant by her 
silence after she discovered the error has sought and now 
seeks an unfair advantage and an unjust enrichment. We 
submit that this is precisely the case which warrants the 
interposition of a court of equity and that the failure to 
intervene would result in a miscarriage of justice. 
It is true that plaintiff when he called for his deed at 
the office of Attorney Clyde did not plat out the descrip-
tion. The proof discloses that the two parcels of land were 
almost identical in size. The descriptions were by metes and 
bounds. Unless a person were familiar with the precise 
dimensions of the two parcels he would not be able to dis .. 
cern from a reading of the deed or deeds whether the re-
spective parcels were correctly described. Each parcel con-
tained exactly four acres. The parcels were practically iden-
tical in shape. The descriptions were almost identical-the 
calls being as follows: The west lines 453.09 vs. 458.70; 
the north lines being identical 417.78 feet each; the east 
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lines 382.47 vs. 376.86 and the south lines 423.71 vs. 425.72. 
\Vhen he delivered the deed to the defendant Mr. Clyde 
~tated to her that he did not know which parcel was de-
~c1·ibed in her deed and it was necessary for him to get out 
a plat and carefully check the description against the plat 
in order to ascertain which parcel was which (Tr. p. 52). 
The evidence conclusively shows, as we hereinafter 
point out, that there was an agreement between plaintiff 
and defendant that the plaintiff was to get the east parcel 
and the defendant the west parcel. Inasmuch as there was 
no dispute about that point the plaintiff when he called for 
his deed did not display any undue want of care or diligence 
in the transaction in not attempting to plat out the descrip-
tion contained in his deed. He assumed that the deeds had 
been drawn in keeping with the agreement of the parties 
and the very fact that he did not check the instrument con-
vinces us that he was relying upon the attorney who drew 
the deed and we submit that such conduct is not so lack-
ing in care as to stay the hand of a court of equity. When 
the plaintiff sold his four acre tract the defendant had not 
recorded her deed and there was nothing on record which 
would call the error to the attention of anyone. Moreover 
a surveyors lath bearing the words in surveyors blue pencil 
"southeast corner of B. W. McMahon's 4 acres" (Tr. p. 31) 
was found in place at the southeast corner of the east par-
cel at the time plaintiff made his sale to the men who 
built the Drive In Theatre That physical evidence was 
further assurance to the plaintiff and his grantees that 
the east parcel was the correct parcel. 
We submit that there was no such lack of care on the 
part of plaintiff as would amount to the violation of a posi-
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tive legal duty to the defendant so as to preclude the equit-
able relief granted by the trial court. 
In conclusion on this first argument of plaintiff w.~ 
further point out and emphasize that all of the circum~ 
stances should be taken into consideration, as the authori-
ties hereinabove quoted direct. The questionable conduct 
of the defendant herself is of direct significance. She dis-
covered the error at the time she received her deed on' or 
about November 30, 1949. Mr. Clyde advised ·her to con~ 
tact her brother the plaintiff and have the matter straight-
ended out (Tr. p. 54). She did nothing fro:m then until May 
29, 1950 when she came to Carbon ·County for Decoration 
Day. At that time she discovered that valuable improve-
ments were being. placed upon the east parcel and she toid 
her husb~nd who was with her to say nothin~ about it' {'fiJ. 
p. 86) . 9n that day she recorded the deed to the east pardel 
in her' own· name and neither advised plaintiff ·nor lii~ 
grantees ·that she claimed the land: upon··which the'lheatt~ 
was· being constructed. She returned· to ·Salt ··Lake and wait~ 
, " ,, • ~ ; , , 1 . , , , J I 
ed 'Jift:y-one. days until July 19, 1950 (Tr. p. 26) to return 
to Carbon County.; and that wa·s the first time that· she in-
. .· . . . . . . !· . 
formed plaintiff's grantees that they were on the wrbng 
property and that was afte~ the.theatr'e had ·been conipie~: 
ed and was iri operation. She. deliberately s·at by· waitiii'g 
for the valuable improvements to be placed ·upo~ ··:th~ 
.. , ·. . . , . ,. :· \ I'' 
property so that she could reap the b~nefits therefr~m. yYe 
submit that her conduct cettainly is such that a 'couft' of 
equ·ity sho'uld feel impeHed · to interv~ne · artd: ··grahf ·~~lief. 
The trial court gave het th~ property which she ·w!anted, 
namely the· west.:. parcel, and it .was the property :which was 
admi~~edly·· .the more valuable tract. The defend::urt: never 
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advanced any reason why she wanted the east parcel except 
that valuable improvements had been placed thereon and 
she wanted to reap the harvest therefrom. 
II 
Defendant's Contention that the Mistake was not a 
Mutual Mistake and is Therefore not Subject to 
Reformation 
The authorities cited by defendant in connection with 
her second argument are all right so far as they go. We 
feel,- however, that there is no need to belabor the point 
as to whether there is a mutual mistake in the instant case. 
The lower court found that there was an agreement that 
the plaintiff was to take the east parcel and the defendant 
the west parcel and it is admitted by everyone that the 
deeds as drawn did not carry out the agreement of the par-
ties. It is true that at the time the deeds were delivered the 
plaintiff did not discover the mistake and the defendant did 
discover the mistake. Under these circumstances relief 
should be granted as set forth in the preceeding argument. 
The fol~owing statement set forth in 19 Am. Juris. page 77 
under the subject "Mutuality; Mistake on Part of Only One 
Party" is applicable : 
Relief will be granted where the evidence 
shows mistake on the part of one of the parties 
and fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the 
other. Accordingly, where, unknown to one of the 
_parties, an instrument contains a mistake render-
ing it at variance with the prior understanding 
and-agreement of the parties and the other party 
learns of this mistake at the time of the execution 
of the instrument and later seeks to take advan-
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tage of it, equity will reform the instrument so 
as to make it conform to the prior understanding. 
In the foot note to the foregoing text the following 
excerpt is in point : 
It was ruled that equity would grant relief 
against the mistake of a complainant in erecting a 
dwelling house on a lot which he supposed he had 
purchased of the defendant, out of a tract belong-
ing to him, but which, on measurement being 
made, was ascertained to be the property of the de-
fendant, and immediately adjoining the lot which 
he really had bought, if the defendant stood silent-
ly by and saw the complainant progressing with 
the work, but permitted him to continue therein. 
McKelway v. Armour, 10 N. J. Eq. 115, 64 Am. 
Dec. 445. 
In the instant case the mistake apparently was not 
made by error of the parties but by the scrivener who drew 
the deeds. The deeds as drawn can fairly be held to con-
stitute a mutual mistake even though the error was dis-
covered by the defendant, because the deeds did not can~y 
out the agreement of the parties. Mr. Clyde testified that 
he arbitrarily assigned the parcels. Neither the plaintiff 
nor the defendant authorized him to make such an arbi-
trary assignment and such arbitrary action on his part 
would not be binding upon plaintiff and defendant. 
III 
Defendant's Contention that there is Insufficient Evidence 
of any Agreement Between the Parties to Justify a 
Reformation of the Deeds 
The trial judge was so impressed with the character 
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and volume of the evidence given by all of the parties to 
this action, including the defendant and her husband, \Vith 
respect to the agreement which vvas reached by plaintiff 
and defendant that he ruled in favor of the plaintiff from . 
the bench and without taking the matter under adviHement 
and stated in part as follows: 
"THE COURT: ... It appears to me, gentle-
men, that there was an agreement had. Apparently 
l\lrs. Tanner when she went for her deed expected 
that she would get a deed to the V\rest parcel. I 
can't explain that speculation unless there had 
been an undersanding or that she had chosen the 
·west parcel and believed that her choice in that 
regard 'vas being acceded to by her brother. And 
it seems to the court that the conduct of both par-
ties be,veen the time that the agreement was 
dra vvn in the office of Mr. Clyde down to the time 
that the deed was delivered to Mrs. Tanner bears 
out that conclusion." (Tr. p. 101). 
We are satisfied that if the appellate court reads the 
transcript in this case that it will be similarly impressed 
and convinced. The evidence is preponderous. It not only 
supports the decision of the trial court- it demands such a 
decision. The evidence is not only of one type or from one 
person but all of the words and conduct of all of the par-
ties lead to the inevitable conclusion that a definite agree-
ment was reached between the parties. We summarize 
this evidence in part as follows : 
(1) Admissions, Statements and Conduct of 
Defendant Mrs. Tanner: 
The first witness called by the plaintiff was the defend-
ant herself. She testified that after the agreement with 
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the. Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corporation, Plaintiff's Exhibit A, 
had be.en entered into .whereby plaintiff and defendant were 
granted the right to repurchase the two four-acre tracts, 
and. before deeds were delivered to either party, defendant 
planted trees and shrubbery on the west tract (Tr. p. 9) and 
stated "At that time I, that was the one that I had chosen, I 
thought I was going to get." She also stated to Mr. Steven-
son, the owner of the service station, that she was going 
to ce his neighbor because "I just thought at that 'time 
that my brother would consider the west side for me" (Tr. 
p. 11). 
On cross examination by her own attorney the defend-
ant testified: 
"Q. . . . Did you ever express a desire to your brother 
as to which tract of land that you would like? The East 
or the West? 
"A. 'Vell- - -
"Q. You can answer it yes or no, did you express a pre-
ference to your brother? 
"A. Well yes, when we first got it. 
"Q. Now which side, a~ the beginning, which tract of 
laJ?.d did you say you wanted? 
"A. I told him that my choice would be on the west 
side. 
"Q. The west side. And hoping that you would get it, 
you planted trees and shrubs on the west tract, is that cor-
rect? 
"A. Well, I thought that, yes." (Tr. p. 19). 
The defendant, testifying on her own behalf on direct 
exam·ination, stated: 
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"Q .... You have heard the testimony given that; ·bY 
your brother that he asked you to designate which tract ·you 
wanted? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you said what? 
"A. I told him I preferred the west side." (Tr. p. 90). 
It should be noted here that defendant was a hostile 
witness, and from her statement that she thought her 
brother might consider the west side for her, and that she 
hoped she would get it, she apparently wished to convey 
the idea that the matter had not been settled. However, 
this was long before the deeds were delivered and her.~e~ti­
mony, later, was that she never talked with her brother, 
. . . . ·.· ·' 
the plaintiff, ag~in about the matter. from about No'Y~;mber 
11, 1948, until after the action was commenced in 1950 (Tr. 
p. 22). 
The actions. of the defendant in going upon .the ground 
in the spring of the year 1949 four or five months follow .. 
ing the meeting in the office of Mr. Clyde and there com 
mencing her landscape improvements by planting trees and 
shrubs on the west parcel is irrefutable 'evidence that an 
agreement had been made between her and her brother be-
cause if no such agreement had been made she would not 
have started to landscape the west parcel. She wanted the 
west parcel from the beginning. She chose it upon being 
granted her f~rst choice.. The evidence shows that the ·west 
tract had be.~n cul~ivated, was more level and .free .:from 
rocks::a.nd. boulders, .-while the east tract. had .in it. a rocky 
knoll~:·i~oulder~ ;~~d an ·.old reser·v~ir,. nutking .. )t ~~~~-,:\4esir-
··· ' . . . . . ' . . .. ,; ··~ " 
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able for building purposes (Tr. p. 59). The trial court in his 
op1nion stated, 
"THE COURT: I may be in error about this 
but I think I am right in the conclusions that I 
have reached and I don't think that this will re-
sult in any loss to the defendant because undoubt-
edly the west parcel in this area will probably be 
of greater value to her than the east parcel." (Tr. 
p. 102). 
(2) Statements and Admissions made by 
Defendant to Edward W. Clyde, a Disinterested Witness 
in the Lawsuit: 
Mr. Edward Clyde, Attorney at Law, and draftsman of 
the deeds and contract with the Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corpo-
ration, testified that when the defendant came for her deed, 
and learned that it described the east tract, said: 
"A. She said, 'This is the wrong piece,' and I 
said, 'What do you me,an it is the wrong piece,' and 
she said, 'Ben and I agre,ed that he would take this 
one and that I would get the other one, ' ... Well, 
Ben and I agreed that he get this piece and I would 
get the other one.' 'Now I said, 'Mrs. Tanner, you 
mean agreed or you mean just talked about it.' 
And she said, 'We understood that was the way it 
was to be,' and I don't remember which one of them 
she said, but she said one of us planted some trees 
or plants on the piece we are to get and I am get-
ting the wrong piece. She requested me to straight-
en it up and I told her that I couldn't, that the deed 
was already delivered to Ben and I told her that if 
she contacted Ben that he would straighten it up. 
And she said, "No he wouldn't, he has tricked me 
again." I then told her that I didn't think Ben 
knew which piece he had, tha;t I hadn't shown him 
on the plat. But I thought if he contacted her it 
would be straightened out again. And she said, 
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.. No, he has just tricked me again" And paid the 
$100 and took the deed (Tr. p. 53-54). 
Mr. Clyde testified further that the defendant called 
him on the telephone after the construction on the theatre 
had been commenced if not completed, and he reminded her 
· ' '·that she wanted the west tract' "and that you said you and 
Ben had agreed that you'd get this piece and he'd get the 
other one. Now this is your chance to get the piece that you 
wanted, just try him," and she said, "Well, I don't know 
whether I want to do that or not, I will think about it." (Tr. 
p. 55). 
The words emphasized in defendant's admissions to 
Mr. Clyde as above set forth do not suggest a mere "de-
claration of conflicting preferences" as suggested by Mr. 
Maw in his brief, but on the contrary impel the conclusion 
that the parties had reached a definite and clearcut agree-
ment. The trial court was so impressed. 
(3) Statements of Mr. Paul L. Tanner, the Husband 
of Defendant 
Mr. Paul L. Tanner, the husband of the defendant, was 
present at the office of Mr. Clyde and on direct examina-
tion he stated that "after the agreement was drawn up it 
was necessary to decide which plot was going to which one 
and Mr. Clyde pressed them to make a choice and the choice, 
first choice finally after going back and forth ended up with 
Mrs. Tanner expressing a preference for the west piece, par-
cel of land." (Tr. pp. 76 and 77). He goes on to say that' the 
plaintiff just made the comment by way of exclamation 
"that is the parcel I wanted." This witness states that 
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they may have talked about the matter after they left the 
office but he could not remember (Tr. p. 78). 
Tanner also accompanied his wife to Mr. Clyde's of-
fice \\7hen she picked up the deed and he quotes his wife 
as saying on that occasion: "I thought I was going to get 
the west parcel" (Tr. p. 79). 
Mr. Tanner accompanied his wife to Carbon County 
th~ day before Decoration Day the following spring, that 
is on May 29, 1950. Both he and his wife saw the improve-
ments going up on the east parcel. Tanner states: 
"And when she saw the improvements on that 
property she immediately said to me, Now don't 
you say a word to Woody [the plaintiff] when we 
are here about that, that I own the east property. 
She says, Don't you say a word. So we went up 
there and for once I followed her orders, I didn't 
say anything." (Tr. p. 86). 
Tanner testified that he helped his wife plant the 
shrubbery on the west parcel. 
"Q. And you planted those trees after you 
knew that your vvife had chosen that parcel? [ The 
west parcel ] . 
"A. After she had chosen it, that's right." 
(Tr. p. 88). 
(4) Testimony of B. W. McMahon, Plaintiff: 
The sister, Mrs. Tanner, was given her choice. Mr. 
Clyde urged that they come to a decision. The plaintiff 
said: 
" 'Well, let Melissa [ the defendant ] make her 
choice.' He, [ Mr. Clyde ] insisted that we should 
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make the choice now and the choice was 1nade at 
that time. 
"Q. In his presence ? 
A. In his presence. 
Q. Did he hear? 
A. I don't know about that. It was made in 
his presence. 
Q. But you didn't make, determine for your-
self that he knew which piece you were to get and 
\vhich she was to get? 
A. Well that's what he said I did. But I don't 
know. He asked me, 'Is that OK with you Mac?' 
I said, 'Yes.' 'I give her her choice and that is OK 
with me.' " (Tr. pp. 65 and 66). 
On May 29, 1950, the day before Decoration Day, the 
plaintiff narrates the following statements as having been 
made: 
"A. My wife said to lVIrs. Tanner, said, "We 
have sold our 4 acres of ground there and they 
are putting up a drivein theater." 
Q." Did Mrs. Tanner say anything to that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did she say? 
A. "Yes, so I noticed, so vve noticed." "Yes, 
so we noticed." 
On cross examination the plaintiff stated to Mr. Maw, 
"I told her [the defendant] that was the side that my 
choice would have been." 
( 5) Agnes McMahon, Wife of Plaintiff: 
Her statements corroborate the statements of her hus-
band (Tr. pp. 69 to 74 inclusive). 
(6) Admissions made by Defendant to Mario Marchino, 
Phillip Turner and Bernard W. Cline, Grantees 
from the Plaintiff: 
These three men went to Salt Lake City on or about 
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July 19, 1950 for the express purpose of talking with the 
defendant and her husband about the problem which con-
fronted them. Mr. Marchino testified that the defendant 
at said time and place told them that, 
"Although that her and her brother, B. W. 
McMahon, had agreed that she was to take the 
west parcel and B. W. the east parcel, why now 
that the theater was on the west [ east ] parcel 
that naturally that was the most valuable and that 
was the land she wanted." (Tr. p. 27). 
Mr. Turner testified as to the conversation in Salt 
Lake in the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Tanner as follows: 
"And she said that she and her brother Ben 
had agreed on which piece of ground was to belong 
to who and she had chosen the west parcel and he 
the east parcel. She also said ·at that time tha.t 
she thought that it was better for him to have the 
east parcel because the electricity was there at the 
corner of that piece or ground where it would be 
easy for him to hook on ~:ld later when she decided 
to build she could put the electricity down to her 
place." (Tr. p. 43). 
Mr. Bernard W. Cline testified with respect to the 
conversation in the home of defendant and her husband 
at Salt Lake City: 
"Q. Was anything said as to the respective 
ownership of the east and west parcels?" 
"A. Yes ::: ::: * and that there had been a de-
finite agreement of who was to have what piece 
of land, and I believe even they mentioned con-
tacting the lawyers in Salt Lake City concerning 
the mistake that had been made." 
"Q. Did they say what mistake had been 
made? 
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·'A. Yes, she said that they were to receive the 
west, I don't want to get confused here, but they 
were to receive the west part and Woody was to 
receive the east part." (Tr. pp. 48 and 49). 
Although both the defendant and her husband were 
called as witnesses and although both of them were present 
on the occasion testified to by all three of the above wit-
, 
nesses, neither the defendant nor her husband denied by 
way of rebuttal or otherwise any of the statements attri~ 
buted to them by said three witnesses. Those admissions 
therefore stand undenied. 
( 7) The Significance of the Time of Recording the 
Deed on May 29, 1950: 
All of the testimony offered by both plaintiff and de-
fendant is to the effect that the defendant had her choice 
and she chose the west tract. It was only after she dis-
covered valuable improvements going up on the east tract 
that she expressed a desire for that one. Defendant's deed 
to the east tract was recorded May 29, 1950 at 10:13 A. M. 
(Exhibit A of plaintiff's complaint). :Plaintiff's wife, 
Agnes McMahon, testified that both parties were at the 
Sunnyside cemetery (approximately 30 miles from Price, 
the county seat) ·between 8:30 and 9 o'clock A. M. "It was 
quite early in the morning". Tr. p. 71. "We kind of sensed 
something was wrong but we couldn't figure out wha~ it 
was, but they did come and have a cup of coffee and they 
wouldn't wait until I fixed anything to eat so they just 
had the coffee and a piece of cake." (Tr. pp. 71 and 72). 
The defendant testified : 
"Q. And you arrived there [at Sunnyside 
cemetery] rather early in the morning, did you 
riot, 8 or 9 o'clock?" 
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"A. Oh no, we couldn't ever get here at 8 
o'clock. I don't know, it must have been between 
9 and 10 I guess." (Tr. p. 12). 
Yet the defendant testified " ... When we were going 
to ·nragerton, when we came through Price we stopped and 
had our deed recorded and then we went on to Dragerton." 
(Tr. p. 15). 
Defendant says they stopped at Price on their way to 
Dragerton, and recorded the deed, arriving there "it must 
have been between 9 and 10 I guess," a distance of some 
thirty miles, and yet the deed shows that it was recorded at 
10:13 A. M. 
After holding the deed for several months, through 
the winter, without recording, it is more likely that defend-
and went to Dragerton, taking the deed with the purpose of 
notifying the plaintiff of the mistake and making an ex-
change. But when, on passing the two tracts, it was dis-
covered that extensive and valuable improvements were be-
ing made on the east tract, the one to which she held the 
deed, she decided not to "say anything to Woody about it" 
{Tr. p. 92) and rushed back to Price and had the deed rec-
orded. 
( 8-) Summary on Defendant's Third Contention: 
In light of the overwhelming and conclusive testimony 
to the efftct that there was an agreement between the par-
ties and in light of the conduct of the defendant in land-
scaping the west parcel as well as the conduct of the plain-
tiff in taking possession of the east parcel it seems useless 
to further belabor this subject. The defendant in her 
hrief attempts to explain away the admissions which she 
made to Mr. Clyde to the effect that she and the plaintiff 
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''agreed'' on a division of the land. It is suggested by coun-
sel for defendant that defendant didn't mean "agreed" 
when she said "agreed." As is demonstrated in subdivision 
(1) of this third argument, the defendant, Mrs. Tanner 
not only used the word "agreed" but she used the words 
chosen, that she had received the wrong piece, that her 
brother had tricked her, etc. The admissions made by de-
fendant to Mr. Clyde are in and of themselves conclusive 
proof that an agreement had been reached between plain-
tiff and defendant. 
. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit that the order made by the 
trial court directing a reformation of the deeds has full 
warrant of judicial precedent and authority and that the 
same is the only just and proper order which could be 
made in the premises because the defendant will still ob-
tain the more valuable piece of property in its unimproved 
condition in accordance with her admitted choice and pre-
ference and the order made will prevent her from becom-
ing unjustly enriched through her unworthy actions in 
knowingly sitting by and awaiting the completion of $30~-
000.00 worth of improvements (Tr. p. 29) upon the east 
parcel. 
Respectfully submitted: 
HAMMOND & HAMMOND 
and 
THERALD N. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
Price, Utah 
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